EU “chat control” talks stall again — why message scanning matters to sex workers
The sixth round of negotiations on the EU Child Sexual Abuse Regulation ended on 29 September without a deal on scanning private messages. Where the talks stand, what is still open, and why it matters to sex workers who screen clients in encrypted chats.
EscortFox editorial
· 8 min readContents:
1. Where the talks stand after 29 September2. How we got here3. What is still open4. Why sex workers have a stake in this5. What changes now, and what to do6. Our viewWhere the talks stand after 29 September
On 29 September 2026 negotiators from the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission met for the sixth time to finish the EU’s Child Sexual Abuse Regulation, the law its critics call “chat control”. They did not reach a deal. The open question is the one that has blocked the file for four years: whether, and on what conditions, the content of people’s private messages may be scanned.
According to an account published the next day by Patrick Breyer, a former Pirate Party MEP and one of the proposal’s best-known opponents, the negotiators agreed in principle that authorities can order hosting services such as social networks and cloud storage to scan publicly accessible content for known abuse material. Scanning of private chats and e-mail was not agreed. Technical talks on that part continue through October, and a further round of negotiations in November is expected to be the final attempt at a political deal.
Nobody disputes the goal. Child sexual abuse material is a crime, and platforms should find and remove it. The fight is over the method, and over what happens to everyone else’s private conversations in the process. That includes the conversations sex workers rely on to stay safe.
How we got here
- May 2022: the European Commission proposes the regulation, including “detection orders” that could require messaging services to scan users’ communications for known and new abuse material and for grooming.
- November 2023: the Parliament adopts its position. Detection orders become a last resort, limited in time, targeted at specific users or groups reasonably suspected of a link to abuse, and authorised by a judge. End-to-end encrypted communications are excluded.
- November 2025: after years of deadlock, the Council agrees its own position. It drops mandatory detection orders, but requires providers to assess and reduce the risk of abuse on their services and would make voluntary scanning by providers permanent.
- April 2026: the temporary rules that had let messaging and e-mail providers scan voluntarily since 2021 lapse on 3 April, after the Parliament votes against extending them.
- June 2026: at the fifth round, on 29 June, the negotiators provisionally agree on almost everything except detection. They also agree that this regulation is not the place to regulate age verification, and delete the references to it.
- July 2026: a new temporary regulation, (EU) 2026/1881, restores voluntary scanning by messaging and e-mail providers until 3 April 2028.
What is still open
The remaining gap is about private communications. In Breyer’s account, the Council is pressing for permanent voluntary scanning of non-public content, for detection orders on chats and e-mail that administrative authorities could issue without a court, for thresholds that would not limit those orders to suspects, and for AI-based analysis of images and text to find “suspected” material that is not already known.
The Parliament has held to its 2023 line: scanning of private communications only where there is a link to child sexual abuse, with a judge’s authorisation, and never by breaking end-to-end encryption. One point did go the Parliament’s way, according to the same account: the text will make clear that authorities cannot use the risk-mitigation duties to force providers into “voluntary” scanning.
Why sex workers have a stake in this
The European Sex Workers’ Rights Alliance, which represents sex-worker-led organisations across Europe and Central Asia, has opposed the proposal from the start. In its September newsletter it called the latest version “an incredibly dangerous deal that puts sex workers at imminent risk”. The reasons are practical.
- Safety work happens in private messages. Providers screen new clients, ask for references, share warnings about dangerous clients and check in with a friend before and after a booking, almost always through messaging apps. Directories like ours are where the first contact starts; the conversation that decides whether a booking is safe usually continues on WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal or SMS.
- The content is sexual by nature. Scanning for known abuse material compares files against a database of images already identified as illegal. Analysing images and text for new “suspected” material is a different thing: a system has to guess at age and context. Conversations between consenting adults about sex, and intimate images adults share with each other, are exactly the material such a system has to judge. Every wrong guess means a stranger reviewing someone’s private messages, and possibly a report to the police.
- A report is never harmless for someone in a stigmatised job. In many European countries parts of sex work are still criminalised, and many sex workers keep their work hidden from family, landlords and other employers. A mistaken report can expose them, even if it never leads to a charge.
- Encryption is the floor. Signal’s president Meredith Whittaker said in October 2025 that Signal would rather leave the European market than undermine its encryption. If the strongest tools leave, or are weakened, the people who need private communication most lose the most.
One decision from June deserves credit. Mandatory age verification for messaging apps would have tied accounts to identity documents, ending anonymous messaging for adults as well as children. The negotiators agreed to take it out of this law.
What changes now, and what to do
For now, nothing in the permanent regulation applies, because it does not exist yet. What does apply is the temporary regime: some messaging and e-mail services that are not end-to-end encrypted may scan voluntarily, as they have been allowed to since 2021.
- Use end-to-end encryption for screening. Signal and WhatsApp encrypt chats end to end by default. Telegram does not: its ordinary chats are stored on its servers, and only “secret chats” are end-to-end encrypted. SMS and e-mail are not end-to-end encrypted either.
- Keep work and private life on separate numbers and accounts, so a problem on one does not expose the other.
- Watch November. If the final round produces a deal, the Parliament and the Council still have to approve it formally before it becomes law. The shape of the deal, though, will be decided in that room.
More on vetting clients safely is in our guide Client screening: how escorts vet new clients; support organisations and digital-security help across Europe are listed in Sex-worker support in Europe.
Our view
EscortFox is a classifieds directory. We review every new listing before it goes live, and anyone can report underage or non-consensual imagery through our public removal form. We have every interest in abuse material being found and removed, and we support targeted action against the people who produce and share it.
The Parliament’s position is the right line: detection orders as a last resort, aimed at people suspected of abuse, approved by a judge, and never at the cost of end-to-end encryption. What we would argue against is scanning everyone’s private messages on the off chance, and handing AI systems the job of deciding which adult conversations look suspicious. That would make the safety tools sex workers depend on less safe, while putting their most private conversations in front of strangers. Protecting children and protecting private communication are not opposites, and the final text should not treat them as if they were.
Parliament’s 2023 position and the Council’s 2025 mandate are both public; the Parliament’s summary is a good place to start.
Background reading
Client screening: how escorts vet new clientsen
Sex-worker support in Europe: help, health and legal aid by countryen
Sources
Patrick Breyer — Chat Control 2.0 trilogue update: no mass scanning deal for now (30 Sep 2026)
Council of the EU — doc. 11501/26, outcome of the fifth trilogue of 29 June 2026 (7 Jul 2026)
European Sex Workers’ Rights Alliance — Your ESWA Monthly: September (29 Sep 2026)
CyberInsider — Signal vows to leave European market if Chat Control becomes law (6 Oct 2025)
EscortFox editorial
Written by the EscortFox editorial team. We cite primary sources — judgments, statutes, official bodies — and link the coverage we drew on. Quote and link freely.